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CHAPTER 6
Housing Policies 
in Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and 
the United States 
Christian Hilber and Olivier Schöni
6.1Introduction
In this chapter, we provide an analysis of the housing market and current 
housing policies in three developed countries: the United Kingdom 
(UK), Switzerland, and the United States (US). All three countries are 
founding members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). They are all high-income economies with a high 
Human Development Index and all three are highly urbanized today: 77% 
of Swiss (2010), 84% of Americans (2010), and 82% of residents in England 
and Wales (2011) lived in urban areas according to their respective censuses.
We did not select these three countries at random. We chose the UK 
and Switzerland because they represent two opposite ends of the spectrum 
with respect to their ﬁscal and land-use planning policies, making them 
interesting cases from the point of view of a comparative analysis. The 
US falls between these two extremes; while it has a decentralized ﬁscal 
system (with local, state, and federal taxes) similar to the Swiss one, the 
country is characterized by an enormous spatial heterogeneity in land-
use planning restrictiveness, ranging from very relaxed (in places such as 
Houston or much of the midwest) to highly restrictive (in cities such as 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, or New York); thus, providing useful variation 
that can be exploited in a comparative analysis.
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The three countries do not only differ in their institutional settings but 
also in their housing policies. These policies have evolved over time within 
the institutional, political, economic, and cultural context of the respective 
country. In this paper we illustrate how the institutional setting—in particular 
a country’s land-use planning and ﬁscal system—inﬂuences urban form, the 
built environment, housing market conditions, and the perceived challenges 
and risks (e.g., housing affordability, housing shortage, or homeownership 
attainment). The current housing policies attempt to tackle these problems, 
but—as we document—many of them have severe unintended consequences 
and are ineffective and costly at best and harmful at worst.
Trying to identify the origins of the key policies of the three 
countries and analyzing their merits and demerits provides a broader 
and clearer picture of the consequences of speciﬁc housing policies for 
given institutional settings. It may thus help governments of emerging 
economies in Asia (and elsewhere) to learn some lessons for the 
implementation of their own respective housing policies. 
To begin, the UK is a highly politically and ﬁscally centralized country 
with a rigid planning system focused on urban containment. It is a country 
of homeowners, although homeownership has been in decline recently, 
falling from 69.3% in 2002 to 63.5% in 2013. The country’s main political 
concern is the housing shortage and its corresponding lack of affordable 
dwellings. We document that the housing shortage and lack of affordability 
are a direct consequence of the planning system—implemented more 
than 70 years ago—as well as of the extreme form of ﬁscal and political 
centralization. We outline the key policies (e.g., Help-to-Buy) that attempt 
to address the housing shortage and affordability crisis. These policies 
have the effect of propping up demand and, because supply is severely 
constrained, of increasing house prices. Thus, they fail to resolve the 
housing affordability crisis. Homeownership attainment is another closely 
related political concern. Intriguingly, the evidence from recent empirical 
research suggests that key policies that aim to increase homeownership 
attainment (e.g., the Mortgage Interest Deduction in the US or Help-to-Buy 
in the UK) may not, in fact, positively affect aggregate homeownership rates 
and may even lower them in supply-constrained locations.1 
1 On the one hand, subsidies to existing or prospective homeowners (such as the 
Mortgage Interest Deduction or Help-to-Buy) lower the cost of owner-occupied 
housing. On the other hand, the subsidy-induced demand increase is likely to raise 
prices of owner-occupied housing in supply-constrained locations, thus increasing 
the cost of homeownership. One might expect that the net effect may be positive 
or neutral depending on supply conditions (i.e., depending on whether the subsidy 
is fully capitalized into prices or not). In fact, Hilber and Turner (2014) outline a 
number of theoretical mechanisms that explain why the net effect may even be 
negative in places with inelastic housing supply. They also provide evidence for the 
US consistent with the proposition that, in supply-constrained locations, the impact 
of the subsidies on homeownership attainment is negative. 
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Switzerland in many respects is the counterpart to the UK. It is one 
of the most politically and ﬁscally decentralized countries in the world 
with a ﬂexible zoning system and a unique political setting with direct 
democracy at all levels of government: federal, regional (cantons), and 
local (municipalities). While housing affordability is a concern among a 
fraction of lower-income households, the main housing-related policy 
issue in the recent past has arguably been sprawl—not so much urban 
sprawl in the larger cities of the country as a phenomenon that could 
be described as “rural sprawl” in the more touristic mountainous 
areas. We argue that the housing policies enacted are, to a large extent, 
a direct consequence of the degree of ﬁscal decentralization and the 
implemented land-use planning system. The key policy for “rural sprawl 
containment” is a ban on second (investment) homes in tourist areas in 
place since 2013. We discuss the intended and unintended consequences 
of this policy. 
Another unique characteristic of Switzerland’s housing market is its 
extremely low homeownership rate, still below 40%, despite a slow but 
steady increase over the last few decades and a steeper increase since the 
early 1990s. Because the median voter in Switzerland is still a renter, the 
implemented policies are unsurprisingly tilted toward favoring renters. 
The key policy in place, aimed at helping renters, is a mild form of rent 
stabilization that allows landlords to raise rents if a tenant changes or 
if some speciﬁc conditions are met such as an increase in the mortgage 
interest rate or a major renovation is carried out. We discuss the various 
merits and demerits of this policy.
Finally, the US is interesting because parts of the country—mainly 
the large coastal “superstar” cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Boston, or New York—are confronted with strong demand pressures 
and rigid land-use controls. Other parts of the country—including the 
midwest and Texas—have lax land-use regulations. This unique setting 
allows us to test the hypothesis that supply constraints imposed by rigid 
planning make the housing supply curve inelastic and, thus, housing 
subsidies—such as the Mortgage Interest Deduction—are capitalized 
into higher house prices, offsetting the intended effects of the policy. We 
summarize evidence in support of this hypothesis.
We proceed as follows. For each of the three countries, we (i) 
review the current status of the housing market and describe the main 
challenges and risks facing policy makers, (ii) describe the key housing 
policies currently implemented, (iii) discuss the policies’ intended 
distributional effects and other objectives, (iv) provide an analysis of the 
merits and demerits—often unintended consequences not considered by 
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policy makers—of the key policies, and (v) discuss the lessons learned 
from our analysis of the key policies. In a ﬁnal step, we bring together 
the evidence from all three countries and provide a synthesis.
6.2Housing Policies in the United Kingdom2
6.2.1Current Status of the Housing Market
Housing in the UK—particularly in London and the southeast of 
England—is some of the most expensive and cramped3 in the world. 
According to a ranking by the Global Property Guide (2015) of the 
buying price per square meter of a “comparable apartment” in a prime 
inner-city area of a country’s prime city—in the UK, this is London—the 
UK comes second. It is only topped by the tiny city-state and tax haven, 
Monaco. Not only UK house prices, but also UK rents, are extraordinarily 
high. The same comparable apartment in London is also the second-
most expensive in the world, again topped only by Monaco. 
Table 6.1 provides the relative housing costs by economy (city), with 
the UK (London) being the benchmark (100%). Astonishingly, housing 
costs in the UK are almost twice as high as those in the US (New York, 
53.6%) and they are signiﬁcantly more than twice as high as those in 
Switzerland (Geneva, 44.2%), despite Switzerland being one of the 
wealthiest countries in the world and Geneva, typically, being one of the 
cities at or near the top of life-quality rankings.
2 The discussion of UK housing policies in this section builds on a recent analysis in 
Hilber (2015a).
3 New houses in the UK are 38% smaller than in densely populated Germany and 40% 
smaller than in the more densely populated Netherlands (Statistics Sweden 2005). 
Not only are new housing units small in an international comparison, but allegedly 
also the existing housing stock. Moreover, the existing stock in the UK tends to be 
substantially older and, partly as a consequence of this, of poorer quality compared 
with other OECD countries with similar standards of living, such as the US or 
Switzerland.
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Table 6.1: International Comparison of Relative Housing Costs 
(prices and rents per square meter; by economy (city)—UK (London) = 
100%; 2014)
Economy (City)
Price/m2 in % 
relative to UK 
(London) (Rank)
Rent/m2 in % 
relative to UK 
(London) (Rank)
Monaco 174.1% (1) 101.8% (1)
United Kingdom (London) 100.0% (2) 100.0% (2)
Hong Kong, China 66.1% (3) 58.5% (4)
US (New York) 53.6% (4) 63.9% (3)
France (Paris) 53.3% (5) 47.2% (6)
Russian Federation (Moscow) 46.4% (6) 46.4% (7)
Switzerland (Geneva) 44.2% (7) 42.8% (8)
Singapore 44.2% (8) 39.1% (9)
India (Mumbai) 33.2% (9) 24.5% (16)
Japan (Tokyo) 31.2% (10) 48.4% (5)
Israel (Tel Aviv) 27.5% (11) 29.4% (11)
Sweden (Stockholm) 27.3% (12) NA
Finland (Helsinki) 24.3% (13) 26.9% (14)
Canada (Toronto) 23.9% (14) 27.4% (13)
Italy (Rome) 23.2% (15) 27.6% (12)
Luxembourg 22.2% (16) 26.4% (15)
Australia (Sydney) 22.1% (17) 31.1% (10)
UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.
Source: Hilber (2015a). All data are derived from www.globalpropertyguide.com/most-expensive-cities 
(accessed 1 February 2015). Relative prices and rents are based on own calculations.
Housing costs in the UK are not only high in absolute terms but also 
relative to incomes. Conventionally measured “housing affordability”—
median house price to median income—in the Greater London Area is 
currently at its worst since data became available. The price-to-income 
multiple in the Greater London Area in 2014 was 8.5. The UK, as a whole, 
was somewhat less unaffordable with a multiple of 5.0 (Demographia 
2015). 
UK house prices are not only extraordinarily high but also 
exceptionally volatile. Real house price swings in the UK—illustrated 
in Figure 6.1—were substantially larger during the last full real estate 
cycle (i.e., the upswing of the 1980s and the downturn of the 1990s) than 
those in the single-most volatile metropolitan area in the US (Hilber and 
Vermeulen 2016). 
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The current housing affordability crisis has been developing slowly 
over the last 40 years. House price growth in the UK has been faster than 
in any other OECD country over this period. Figure 6.1 illustrates the 
country’s real house price index (HPI) and real gross domestic product 
(GDP) between 1974 and 2014. UK house prices are today more than 
twice as high, in real terms, as they were in 1974. The UK’s HPI, which 
rose by 113% (from 100% to 213%), slightly exceeds the real GDP growth 
per capita, which grew by 105%. Within the UK, the price growth has 
been most pronounced in London: the ratio of London house prices 
to average UK house prices has increased substantially since the mid-
1990s. London housing prices have displayed a staggering increase in 
the last few years. In 2014, the London HPI reached an all-time high 
Figure 6.1: UK House Price Index (real), UK GDP per Capita 
Index (real), and Construction Index (1969 = 100)
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value of 344% with respect to the 1974 base year, outstripping the real 
GDP growth per capita of about 140%. This explains why housing is 
most unaffordable in London and the southeast, even when holding 
earnings constant.
Despite rising real incomes and signiﬁcant population growth 
driven by net immigration and despite strongly growing nominal 
and real housing prices, construction of new permanent dwellings 
has been decreasing dramatically since the late 1960s, leading 
to a substantial housing shortfall. According to the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (2015a), the UK built nearly 
380,000 new homes in the ﬁscal year of 1969, when statistics began. 
Housing construction subsequently declined until it fell markedly below 
200,000 from 1990–1991 onward. Residential construction reached a 
record low in 2012 with less than 135,510 new homes. In 2013, ﬁgures 
were only slightly higher at 140,930, reﬂecting the typical increase 
in housing construction associated with an economic recovery. As 
illustrated in Figure 6.1, between 1974 and 2013, housing construction 
fell by 50% despite strongly rising real house prices.
The extremely high UK house prices, particularly in London and the 
southeast of the country, have also affected homeownership attainment. 
Homeownership has been on the rise since World War II. As Figure 6.2 
illustrates, homeownership also increased markedly during the 1980s. 
This can be mainly attributed to the so-called “Right-to-Buy” scheme 
introduced by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government in 1980. 
At that point, merely 55.4% of UK households were homeowners, 33.1% 
were social renters, and 11.4% rented privately. The share of social renters 
has been falling signiﬁcantly since then, while the homeownership rate 
has taken the opposite direction. The homeownership rate continued 
to grow during the 1990s and it reached its peak in 2002 with 69.6%. 
At that point, 20.9% and 9.8% of dwellings were socially and privately 
rented, respectively. Since 2002, the homeownership rate has been in 
decline, reaching a tentative low point of 63.6% in 2013, the latest year 
with available numbers (DCLG 2015b). At the same time, the private 
rental rate has increased very substantially to 18.6%, while the social 
rental rate fell to 18%.
Interestingly, given the massive housing shortage in the UK, which 
can perhaps most accurately be described as a “construction drought,” 
the residential vacancy rate has been stable during the last decade, 
ranging between 2.3% and 2.9% from 2004 to 2013 (Figure 6.2). The UK 
vacancy rate is lower than that of the US. This is not surprising given the 
massive overbuilding and subsequent foreclosure crisis in the US during 
the 2007–2009 global ﬁnancial crisis. What is perhaps more surprising is 
the fact that the residential vacancy rate is currently substantially higher 
Housing Policies in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States 217
in the UK than in Switzerland, despite a massive housing shortfall in the 
UK and a minor housing construction boom in Switzerland in recent 
years. This could, in part, be driven by the fact that the UK, in contrast 
to Switzerland, contains numerous struggling and declining cities (such 
as Liverpool, Blackpool, and Sunderland) with stagnating or declining 
populations and, thus, comparably weak housing demand, likely causing 
some houses to be empty. In part, it could also be driven by the strict 
local planning constraints in the UK: in places with strict regulatory 
constraints, the supply of new housing, and the characteristics of the 
existing stock are less well adapted to the structure of demand for 
housing characteristics and, thus, may be more likely to stay empty. See 
Cheshire, Hilber, and Koster (2015) for evidence on the latter.
Figure 6.2: UK Homeownership and Vacancy Rates (%)
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6.2.2 Explaining the Current Status of the Housing 
Market: The Role of the UK Land-Use Planning 
System
Long-standing empirical research points clearly to the UK’s land-use 
planning system—in conjunction with strong demand for housing in 
some regions, notably the Greater London Area and the southeast—as the 
main cause of the UK’s housing affordability crisis (Ball, Allmendinger, 
and Hughes 2009; Barker 2003, 2004, 2006; Cheshire 2009 and 
2014; Cheshire, Nathan, and Overman 2014; Hilber 2015a; Hilber and 
Vermeulen 2010 and 2016; Overman 2012).4 
The UK planning system,5 which dates back to the Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1947,6 is extraordinarily rigid by world standards. This 
is a consequence of urban containment through so-called “green belts” 
(introduced during the mid- and late-1950s), strict controls on height, 
and lack of ﬁscal incentives to develop at the local level. The system’s 
rigidity is exacerbated by the use of so-called “development control.” 
4 The negative effects of the UK’s planning system are not conﬁned to housing. 
Cheshire and Hilber (2008) provide evidence that ﬁrmly links regulatory constraints 
to the extraordinarily expensive price of UK office space. Cheshire, Hilber, and 
Kaplanis (2015) demonstrate that “Town Centre First” policies in England imposed 
a loss of output of 32% on a typical store opening after the rigorous implementation 
of the policy in 1996. Cheshire, Hilber, and Sanchis-Guarner (2014) provide evidence 
that Town Centre First policies paradoxically made shopping trips less “sustainable” 
via nudging suburban residents to shop in congested town centers rather than in big-
box retailers out-of-town. Moreover, tight planning constraints in the UK may also 
have increased commuting times (e.g., due to commuters having to “jump” the green 
belt) or may have discouraged new buildings and renovations, thus generating older 
housing of poorer quality relative to other comparable countries. Of course land-use 
planning can also generate beneﬁts through correcting for various market failures 
(internalizing negative and positive externalities and providing local public goods 
such as public parks or the preservation of historically important buildings). The 
net welfare effect of the existing planning regime is not in itself clear but the scarce 
evidence for the UK is indicative that the net welfare impact is, in fact, negative 
(Cheshire and Sheppard 2002; Hilber and Vermeulen 2016).
5 We somewhat casually refer here to the “UK planning system” even though there 
are notable differences between the planning systems of the four UK countries: 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. While the planning systems in 
the four countries all follow the same guiding principles, there are some signiﬁcant 
differences in how rigorously these principles are applied. For example, Town Centre 
First policies are applied much more rigorously in England than in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland.
6 To be more precise the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 was an Act of 
Parliament in the UK passed by the postwar Labour government. It came into effect 
on 1 July 1948 along with the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act of 1947. It is 
the foundation of modern town and country planning in the UK.
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This makes all decisions about whether development can go ahead 
subject to local political calculations and, therefore, more uncertain. 
Development control also facilitates “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) 
behavior.
Early empirical evidence by Hall et al. (1973) suggests that the 
UK planning system may have already imposed binding constraints 
on construction as early as the beginning of the 1970s. While rigorous 
empirical evidence on this point is lacking, it is highly plausible that 
the green-belt constraints—which affect all major UK cities—started 
to become binding around 1970, when growing demand for housing, 
in effect, hit the green-belt boundaries. When this happened, NIMBY 
homeowners (and private landlords) residing near green belts started to 
oppose new construction in their local authorities, effectively imposing 
gradually more severe “horizontal” constraints on construction. This, 
in conjunction with various “vertical” constraints (i.e., building height 
restrictions or so-called “view corridors”7), gradually made housing 
supply less and less price elastic. Thus, as the demand for housing 
continued to grow, especially in the Greater London Area (the UK’s 
economic powerhouse), real house prices started to rise drastically, 
and commuters, desperate for affordable housing, started to “jump” the 
green belts.
Increasingly binding planning constraints are the likely explanation 
why housing construction numbers have been in continued decline since 
the late 1960s. In 1970, the UK built close to 380,000 new homes, almost 
three times as many as today. In those days, there were fewer constraints 
on where new housing could be built. Price signals still provided 
important information to developers, architects, and builders on where 
and how much to build. Today, the planning system completely ignores 
price signals and effectively tries to prevent residential development 
nearly anywhere, particularly where it would be attractive to build. 
If price signals were taken into account, more housing would be built 
in attractive areas, with more high-rise buildings in town centers, and 
more single-family homes further out (Hilber 2015c). 
7 View corridors, by means of limiting the height of nearby buildings, aim to preserve 
an unobstructed view to places deemed of particular value. London’s St. Paul’s 
Cathedral, for example, is protected by six view corridors imposing constraints on 
construction in large parts of Central London. One such view corridor—created in 
1710—imposes a view from King Henry VIII’s Mound in Richmond Park to St. Paul’s 
Cathedral at a distance of over 10 miles (16 kilometers). The view frames the cathedral 
through a special gap in a hedge, down a specially maintained clear avenue and then 
all the way across London. This particular view, still enforced today, has severely 
limited development around Liverpool Street Station—the third most frequented 
train station in the UK and one of the most central and busy areas in London.
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Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) provide the arguably most rigorous 
econometric evidence to date for England on the impact of local land-
use planning restrictiveness and other types of supply constraints 
on local house prices. What the study ﬁnds is that local-earnings 
shocks lead to much greater local house price increases in severely 
planning-constrained locations. The study provides evidence that can 
be interpreted in a causal sense: regulatory restrictiveness causally 
affects house prices. While regulatory constraints appear to be binding 
everywhere, the effects are starkest in London and the southeast, where 
refusal rates (i.e., the proportion of planning applications that are 
refused by local planning authorities) are highest and land-use planning 
restrictions most binding.8 Housing is not being built in the most 
desirable areas, where demand pressure is greatest, but in those local 
authorities where it is still feasible to get the green light for development. 
Often these are local authorities with high unemployment rates, which 
have economic incentives to permit local development: construction 
creates local jobs, if only temporarily. 
To give a sense of the economic magnitude of the effects, according 
to the estimates in Hilber and Vermeulen (2016), house prices would 
have risen by about 100% less in real terms between 1974 and 2008 if, 
hypothetically, all regulatory constraints were removed. Removing all 
regulatory constraints is of course neither realistic nor desirable. More 
pragmatically, if the southeast (UK’s regions with the most severe 
planning constraints) had the regulatory restrictiveness of the northeast 
of England (the least restrictive UK region, but still highly restrictive in 
an international comparison), its house prices would have been roughly 
25% lower in 2008 and—based on forecasted trends—about 30% lower 
in 2015. 
Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) also ﬁnd that regulatory constraints 
are not the only constraints that are binding. There are also constraints 
8 Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) provide a theoretical argument for why not 
all regions and local authorities are equally restrictive. They argue that land-use 
restrictions beneﬁt owners of developed land via increasing prices but hurt owners of 
undeveloped land via increasing development costs. In such a setting, more desirable 
locations are more developed and, as a consequence of political economy forces, 
more regulated. Translating this theoretical argument to the institutional setting of 
the UK, this implies that, in the wealthiest and most desirable local authorities with 
the strongest demand pressures (mainly in the Greater London Area), homeowners 
and private landlords have most assets to protect so they have the strongest 
incentives to restrict local development either via voting and NIMBYism-objections 
(homeowners) or lobbying (private landlords). Struggling places with weak demand 
and high unemployment (mainly in the north of the country) may be more prone to 
permit commercial, or even residential development, in an attempt to create local 
retail or office jobs, or, temporarily, local construction jobs.
Housing Policies in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States 221
due to scarcity of developable land. These are conﬁned to highly 
urbanized areas. However, in these areas—most pronounced in the 
Greater London Area—the effect is large, in the sense that, due to scarcity 
constraints, house prices increase more strongly in response to given 
positive demand shocks. Put differently, house prices in London would 
still be high by world standards if the various regulatory constraints 
were relaxed. Topographical constraints were also found to be binding 
but the effect of these constraints was quantitatively less meaningful, 
perhaps because England is largely a ﬂat country with few slopes that 
really hinder construction severely.
The UK planning system also has important distributional effects. 
The groups of the young, and not so young, would-be buyers are the 
obvious losers of the constraints imposed by the UK planning system. 
However, young home-owning families are also losers of the broken 
system, although they often don’t realize it. They lose out because they 
(i) live in artiﬁcially cramped housing, and (ii) are increasingly priced 
out from moving to a larger home that would be more adequate for 
their growing family. Trading up becomes increasingly difficult and the 
problem is made worse by the UK Stamp Duty Land Tax that heavily 
taxes housing transactions (Hilber 2015c; Hilber and Lyytikäinen 2015). 
Elderly homeowners could be argued to be the winners of the 
system because their houses have experienced tremendous (untaxed) 
capital gains since the late 1960s and early 1970s and they typically no 
longer live in cramped housing since their children have moved out. If 
anything, given the reduced household size, they may well now over-
consume housing and may well have gardens too big to maintain.
The trouble from the perspective of elderly homeowners is that 
they cannot really access their housing wealth unless they sell their 
home—a costly and burdensome endeavor especially for the elderly—
and either downsize or move to a cheaper location, thereby often having 
to give up their local social ties. Equity release (in US parlance: reverse 
mortgages) may represent an alternative option for elderly homeowners 
to monetize their housing wealth. However, according to Burgess, 
Monk, and Williams (2012), equity release represented only about 2.1% 
of mortgage sales in the ﬁrst half of 2011 in the UK. This low percentage 
may be due to several factors such as a perceived lack of transparency 
of the instruments, concerns about the quality of the ﬁnancial advice, 
drawbacks linked to concerns about having to move out of the property, 
and absence of long-term planning for old age. Private renting is not a 
better option for elderly homeowners because it is similarly costly (to 
owning) and legal protection of renters in the UK is poor. 
Hence, the only real winners of the broken UK planning system are 
arguably those elderly homeowners who are prepared to sell their house, 
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pocket the proceeds, and move to a country with cheaper housing. For 
those who stay put, it is the children who will eventually beneﬁt. The 
children of renters lose out. The planning system, thus, cements wealth 
inequality (Hilber 2015c). 
6.2.3 Key Housing Policies, Their Objectives, Merits, 
and Demerits
As the previous section documented, the UK’s affordability crisis 
has been developing slowly over the last 40 years. In contrast to real 
incomes, real house prices and, presumably, real private rents9 have 
grown faster in the UK than in any other OECD country (Hilber and 
Vermeulen 2016). Especially younger and lower-income households 
struggle to get their feet on the housing ladder. 
The key housing policies that were adopted in the past and, 
especially those that were implemented in recent years, not surprisingly, 
thus reﬂect the stylized fact that housing affordability has been the key 
concern of voters and politicians of all stripes. Below we brieﬂy discuss 
the UK’s key policies that have been implemented with the intent to 
address the affordability crisis. We discuss their objectives, as well as 
their merits and demerits. 
6.2.3.1Social Housing 
The birth year of social housing in the UK goes back to 1919. This is 
the year when local authorities (councils) had been required by law to 
provide the so-called “council housing” (also called “council estates”) 
(Wheeler 2015). Local authorities had been the main provider of social 
housing in the UK until 2007. In 2008, housing associations10 outstripped 
local councils for the ﬁrst time to provide the majority of social homes 
in the UK. 
Originally, the aim of council housing was to provide decent housing 
for army recruits. However, the age of social housing only truly arrived 
after World War II, when the Labour Government built more than 
1 million homes, 80% of which were council homes, largely to replace 
9 A good time-series on rents is not publicly available.
10 Housing associations are private, nonproﬁt-making organizations that provide 
low-cost housing for households in need of a home. They have been operating an 
increasing share of social housing properties in the UK since the 1970s. Although 
formally independent of the government, housing associations are regulated by the 
state and receive public funding.
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those destroyed during the war. The house-building boom continued 
throughout the 1950s but near the end of the decade the emphasis 
shifted toward slum clearance (Wheeler 2015). By the early 1970s, 
the downsides of social housing became more visible. In the words of 
Wheeler (2015):
By the early 1970s, the concrete walkways and “streets in the 
sky” that had once seemed so pristine and futuristic, were 
becoming grim havens of decay and lawlessness. And there 
was a powerful smell of corruption emanating from some town 
halls as the cosy relationship between local politicians and 
their friends in building and architecture was laid bare, along 
with the shoddy standard of many of the “system-built” homes 
they had created. It was against this backdrop that “right to 
buy” [discussed below] began to take off, with the number of 
council houses sold in England going up from 7,000 in 1970 to 
nearly 46,000 in 1972.
The provision of social housing has certainly helped the lowest-
income households and the most vulnerable people to obtain more 
adequate housing than they could have in the absence of such 
intervention. Whether public spending on social housing in certain 
areas (“helping places”) was more effective as a policy than giving 
the same amount of funding directly to low-income households and 
vulnerable people (“helping people”) is a difficult question to answer. 
Normally, the answer would be that helping people directly is a more 
effective means of achieving the desired outcome. However, because the 
planning system has increasingly not been responding to price signals 
nearly everywhere in the country, market forces are muted and subsidies 
to people that raise demand may not actually lead to much additional 
private construction of housing. Hence, what would normally be a good 
policy when market forces work properly, may become a policy doomed 
to fail. 
Still, even when we abstract from this general argument that makes 
assumptions about a counterfactual outcome, the track record of social 
housing is mixed. One concern associated with social housing estates 
is that, through the concentration of low-income households, social 
housing may be associated with negative peer effects, for example, 
adversely affecting student performance. Weinhardt (2014) estimated 
the effect of living in a deprived neighborhood—as identiﬁed by a high 
density of social housing—on the educational attainment of 14-year-olds 
in England. He ﬁrst points out that neighborhoods with markedly high 
concentrations of social housing have very high unemployment rates and 
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extremely low qualiﬁcation rates, as well as high building density (social 
housing is typically mid- or high-rise buildings). To identify the causal 
impact of neighborhood deprivation on pupil attainments, Weinhardt 
(2014) then exploits the timing of moving into these neighborhoods. 
He argues that the timing of a move can be taken as exogenous because 
of long waiting lists for social housing in high-demand areas. Using 
this approach, the study ﬁnds no evidence of negative effects of social 
housing neighborhoods on student attainment.  
Another obvious concern with social housing is the fact that when 
the price of rental housing is kept below the market price, inevitably 
there will be a shortage of rental housing: given below-market prices, 
more households demand social housing than there is supply (and given 
below-market prices, developers will not have sufficient incentives to 
provide additional social rental housing). We consider this phenomenon 
in more depth when we analyze the rent control system in Switzerland 
that also arguably generates below-market prices. Because the subsidy 
associated with social housing in the UK is substantial, the waiting list 
is long. Such a long waiting list is obviously inefficient and associated 
with a deadweight loss. Social housing waiting lists also tend to favor the 
“clever” and “persistent” among low-income households rather than 
those most vulnerable (e.g., clinically depressed people). 
A policy related to social housing is the so-called “Section 
106 agreements,” which require private-sector developers to offer 
“affordable housing” as a condition of obtaining planning permission. 
This policy has similar adverse effects to social housing in the sense that 
the demand for such subsidized housing far outstrips supply. 
6.2.3.2Right-to-Buy
The downturn of social housing began in 1980, when Margaret Thatcher 
introduced Right-to-Buy. In brief, the policy allows social tenants to 
purchase their homes at a signiﬁcantly subsidized price, with the effect 
that some of the best social housing stock moved from socially rented to 
privately owned. Right-to-Buy is a crucial factor helping to explain the 
signiﬁcant rise in homeownership from 1980 until 2002, as illustrated 
in Figure 6.2. 
In their recent election manifesto, the Conservative Party proposed 
to extend the Right-to-Buy to tenants of housing associations. What are 
the merits and demerits of this new policy? 
First, consider the likely effect on homeownership attainment. To 
the extent that the discount granted to tenants is substantial, it will have 
the effect of incentivizing many housing association tenants to become 
homeowners, perhaps reversing the decline in the homeownership rate, 
observed since 2002.
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Increasing homeownership attainment may be desirable. There is 
some evidence for the US that homeownership is associated with social 
beneﬁts (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1999). This is true particularly in 
places with tight supply constraints (Hilber and Mayer 2009, and Hilber 
2010). However, there is also evidence suggesting that (leveraged) 
homeownership impairs the labor market (for example, Blanchﬂower 
and Oswald 2013) or adversely affects entrepreneurship (Bracke, Hilber, 
and Silva 2015). So, it is not clear whether the Right-to-Buy subsidy to 
housing association tenants—which essentially randomly beneﬁts some 
lower-income households—is justiﬁable from a social welfare point of 
view. 
Second, the policy imposes signiﬁcant costs upon the tax payer. This 
is because housing associations receive public funding; they presumably 
must be compensated for their losses. Otherwise, Right-to-Buy would 
signiﬁcantly harm housing associations and endanger their ability to 
ﬁnance new homes, which would effectively decrease housing supply. 
Finally, while extending Right-to-Buy will help the selective 
group of tenants of housing associations, the policy will not solve the 
affordability crisis for the rest of the population. If anything, it is likely 
to make it worse, even if the ability of housing associations to ﬁnance 
new homes is unaffected. This is for two reasons: First, a transition 
from housing association tenant to homeowner neither affects total 
housing demand nor total housing supply, so does not create any new 
homes. Second, the incentive of a converted homeowner to oppose new 
construction is likely much larger than that of the identical person as 
a tenant. In aggregate, this will make building new homes even more 
difficult (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2013) and will, thus, if anything, 
accelerate the housing affordability crisis. 
6.2.3.3Help-to-Buy
The so called Help-to-Buy policy was introduced in 2013. The aim of the 
scheme—arguably the ﬂagship housing policy of the previous coalition 
government—has been to stimulate housing demand (Gov.uk 2015). 
The Help-to-Buy scheme consists of four instruments: equity loans, 
mortgage guarantees, shared ownership, and a “new buy” scheme that 
allows buyers to purchase a newly built home with a deposit of only 
5% of the purchase price. The promoters of the policy hoped that the 
increase in demand would translate into new housing being supplied 
and higher homeownership attainment.
Some simple stylized facts, however, cast serious doubt on this 
optimistic view. Help-to-Buy appears to have hindered people to buy. 
To illustrate this, in the year following the announcement of Help-to-
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Buy, between the second quarter (Q2) of 2013 and Q2 2014, according to 
Nationwide,11 the price of the average dwelling in London increased by 
25.8% from £318,200 to £400,400 and a building boom failed to emerge.
The stylized fact that mortgage subsidies may create a house-price 
boom, thus discouraging homeownership attainment, rather than 
stimulating it, is consistent with evidence from the US. Hilber and 
Turner (2014) suggest that there is only a very weak link at best between 
mortgage subsidies and homeownership attainment across the US. They 
document that in tightly regulated metropolitan areas (which may be 
most comparable with tightly contained UK cities) the subsidies have a 
negative effect on homeownership attainment because the price effect—
through increased demand—more than offsets the income effect from 
the tax deduction. They also ﬁnd that in less-regulated metropolitan 
areas (more comparable to sprawling Swiss cities), subsidies do have 
a positive effect on homeownership attainment, but only for higher-
income groups. 
As outlined in the previous section, there is longstanding evidence 
documenting that housing supply in the UK is incredibly unresponsive 
to demand shocks, in large part, because of an extraordinarily inﬂexible 
planning system. Consistent with this, a related study ﬁnds that central 
government grants in the UK are roughly fully capitalized into house 
prices, i.e., the present value of the change in the grant allocation roughly 
equals the change in house price (Hilber, Lyytikäinen, and Vermeulen 
2011). The effect of Help-to-Buy, which also works through stimulating 
the demand side, can thus be expected also to become fully capitalized, 
consistent with the observed extraordinary price increase in London 
after the introduction of the policy.
Apart from not achieving its main intended objective, the policy has 
a number of additional drawbacks. First, taxes are needed to ﬁnance the 
Help-to-Buy schemes and these have a deadweight loss—a pure welfare 
loss to society. Second, the scheme has created a systemic risk in that 
the government (or perhaps more accurately, the taxpayer) assumes 
most of the risks associated with the guarantee schemes. The remaining 
risk is assumed by the “marginal homebuyers,” those who could not 
obtain loans in the absence of the scheme. Third, the policy may have 
undesirable distributional consequences. The beneﬁciaries of the 
scheme are existing homeowners, who beneﬁt from the capital gains. 
First-time buyers who take up the scheme may not be better off, because 
the price increase, quite plausibly, offsets the present value of the subsidy 
11 Nationwide. House Price Index. http://www.nationwide.co.uk/about/house-price-
index/headlines (accessed 12 December 2015).
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they receive. Moreover, they increase their ﬁnancial leverage beyond 
what they could do without Help-to-Buy; they thus expose themselves 
to a greater risk of defaulting. Would-be buyers who are discouraged to 
purchase a home, as a consequence of the policy-induced price increases, 
also lose out because they still ﬁnance the policy as taxpayers. Fourth, 
introducing the scheme is fairly straightforward. However, withdrawing 
it may pose a threat to the macroeconomy. This is because a withdrawal 
will create some obvious (perceived) losers and will likely also have an 
adverse effect on house prices, especially if the withdrawal coincides 
with an economic downturn that forces the government to review its 
costly spending programs. There are a number of further concerns with 
Help-to-Buy and related schemes that are designed to stimulate housing 
demand. These are discussed in Hilber (2013, 2015b, and forthcoming).
6.2.3.4Housing-Related Tax Policies
Housing-related taxes can have important effects on housing 
affordability, especially in a setting with a rigid planning regime. This 
is because, in supply-constrained areas, higher (lower) taxes likely have 
the effect of being capitalized into lower (higher) property prices. Any 
tax-related policy reforms ought to be considered in this light. Below, we 
brieﬂy discuss the key housing-related taxes in the UK, as well as their 
merits and demerits. 
Central Government Grants to Local Authorities and the Council 
Tax
Most local expenditures in the UK are ﬁnanced via central government 
grants, not via local taxes. These grants are distributed to local authorities 
on a “needs” basis according to some complicated formulas that take 
into account numerous characteristics of the local authorities and their 
residents. The distribution mechanism amounts to an “equalization 
system.” One signiﬁcant shortcoming of this is that there is only a very 
weak link at best between permitting new residential development, on 
the one hand, and permanent grant revenue, on the other. 
In brief, local authorities face most of the cost of providing the 
infrastructure and local public services for the newly built residential 
development. At the same time, the central government grants provide 
virtually no ﬁscal incentives to local authorities to permit development. 
This is even more so because NIMBY homeowners and private landlords 
will try to put additional pressure on local authorities to resist new 
development. Local authority politicians interested in reelection have 
strong incentives not to permit residential development in their council. 
If local tax revenue was linked to the amount of local residential 
development, this could provide the necessary incentives to local 
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authorities to permit such development in the ﬁrst place, even under a 
“development control” system. In the UK, however, such tax incentives 
are lacking almost entirely. The only local tax in the UK is the council 
tax, which is a tax based on property value. The tax has little weight in 
the tax system, however, compared with other countries (and compared 
with what it would be under an efficient tax system (Mirrlees et al. 2011). 
It thus is not substantial enough to provide any meaningful incentives to 
local authorities to permit residential development. Moreover, because 
all local revenue is subject to the equalization system, this will largely 
eliminate any council tax revenue gain in the medium term for local 
authorities that permit comparably more development. The council tax 
has one important additional ﬂaw. There has not been a revaluation of 
the tax base since 1992. This has had the consequence that it now bears 
little relation to current underlying property values and has become 
increasingly regressive over time. 
Stamp Duty Land Tax
Stamp duty, which is a tax on real estate transactions (i.e., on land and 
property), was introduced in the UK during the 1950s. It is formally 
paid by the buyer and is a percentage share of the purchase price of the 
house. The economic incidence, however, may be at least partially on 
the seller. The stamp duty effectively drives a wedge between the price 
obtained by the seller and the price paid by the buyer. Basic economic 
intuition suggests that the stamp duty–induced transaction costs result 
in fewer housing transactions and fewer moves, all else equal.12
Until early December 2014, the progressive schedule was a deﬁning 
feature of the UK stamp duty system. The latest reform—announced 
in the government’s 2014 Autumn Statement—eliminated this long-
standing anomaly of the tax: Under the old rules, homebuyers had to 
pay the tax at a single rate on the entire property price. For example, 
a tax rate of 1% levied on a house worth £250,000 resulted in a tax 
payment of £2,500. A tax of 3% was imposed on a house worth £250,001, 
leading to a tax payment of £7,500—a difference of £5,000. Thus, the old 
rules led to large discontinuous jumps in the tax paid at the threshold 
prices (in our example £250,000). Under the new rules, homebuyers 
only have to pay the rate of tax on the part of the property price within 
each tax band. This reform has been a small step in the right direction 
12 Of course, there are many other factors that affect household mobility such as labor 
market conditions, prevalence of rent control, or homeownership rates. Moreover, 
we note that many other countries also impose taxes on land and property transfers, 
often—especially in Southern European and less developed countries—exceeding 
those of the UK.
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in that it has eliminated the large discontinuous jumps in the tax and 
corresponding distortions. It did not address, however, the fundamental 
ﬂaw of the stamp duty land tax (SDLT), which is that the tax creates a 
disincentive to move house. This potentially has adverse consequences 
for the functioning of housing and labor markets.
Empirical research strongly suggests that the adverse effects of the 
SDLT on housing transactions and household mobility are substantial. 
Besley, Meads, and Surico (2014) and Best and Kleven (2015) both 
examine the effect of the 2008–2009 stamp duty “holiday” (i.e., in 
September 2008 the UK government implemented an increase of the 
threshold for paying the SDLT from £125,000 to £175,000 for 1 year to 
stimulate the housing market). While, Besley, Meads, and Surico (2014) 
ﬁnd that the tax holiday temporarily increased transactions by 8%, 
Best and Kleven (2015) estimate the effect on the transaction volume 
to be 20% in the short run. Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2015) ﬁnd that the 
increase in stamp duty from 1% to 3% at the cut-off of £250,000—prior to 
the 2014 stamp-duty reform—reduced the annual rate of mobility by 2 to 
3 percentage points (a large effect given that the average rate of mobility 
is 4.6%). This adverse effect is conﬁned to short-distance and non-job–
related moves, suggesting a distortion in the housing rather than the 
labor market. The key conclusion of this research is that the SDLT is 
a highly inefficient tax. Importantly, it discourages downsizing of the 
elderly and expansion of young families.
A revenue-neutral replacement of the SDLT and the council tax with 
an annual local tax on the true value of property should be a strongly 
preferred outcome. This is for at least two reasons. First, such a tax does 
not affect the decision to move house, and, thus does not distort housing 
and, possibly, labor markets. Second, annual local taxes on the true 
value of property (with the revenue not to be equalized) provide greater 
incentives to local authorities to permit residential development.
6.2.4Lessons Learned
Our analysis of the UK housing market and its policies suggests that the 
UK’s rigid planning system is the main culprit of the housing affordability 
crisis. The planning and ﬁscal systems are incredibly inﬂexible and 
provide insufficient incentives to permit residential development, 
respectively, making the local housing supply curves inelastic. In such 
a setting, the main effect of policies that stimulate housing demand—
such as Help-to-Buy—is to push up house prices rather than increase 
supply. These demand-focused policies may, thus, be a waste of taxpayer 
resources at best. They may even be counterproductive in that they may 
effectively price out young would-be-buyers from the market. 
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If policy makers are serious about addressing the housing 
affordability crisis, then they need to ﬁx the planning system, rather 
than introduce yet more demand-focused policies that push up house 
prices to even higher stratospheres. It is important to stress here that 
ﬁxing the planning system does not mean abandoning it. Planning 
is both necessary and it can generate important beneﬁts to society. 
However, the planning system should not be merely focused on 
constraining residential (and other development) to often unattractive 
brownﬁeld sites in unattractive locations. Instead, the basic principle 
should be that reforms reﬂect issues of market failure so as to ensure 
that land-based public goods (e.g., urban open spaces, wildlife habitats, 
national parks, areas of outstanding natural beauty, historical districts, 
or heritage buildings) are adequately supplied and positive and negative 
externalities arising from the proximity of different land uses are 
internalized. Positive externalities can be internalized, e.g., through 
mixed land-use zones (which spur mutually beneﬁcial activities arising 
from proximity of land uses). Negative externalities can be internalized 
through separation of incompatible land uses. In brief, the planning 
system ought to be focused on addressing market failures.
Hilber (2015a) discusses various reforms on the supply side, 
distinguishing between short-term reforms and more fundamental 
longer-term reforms. In the particular case of the UK, in the short term, 
the boundaries of green belts could be revised to release some accessible 
land with low or negative environmental value and low amenity value 
(Cheshire 2014). 
In the longer term, one could revert to protecting all land only on 
the basis of its environmental or amenity value, taking account of other 
cost factors (infrastructure, carbon footprint, among others). This could 
be done in a way to retain all areas of outstanding natural beauty and 
all national parks but using observed land-price differentials as price 
signals to inform planners where or when land would be more usefully 
released for residential use. If the land-price differentials cannot be 
justiﬁed by environmental or amenity beneﬁts, then there would be a 
presumption in favor of development (Cheshire and Sheppard 2005).
Other supply-side reforms could work via altering tax incentives at 
the local level. In an ideal world, the existing council tax and the stamp 
duty land tax—two highly distortive taxes (Hilber 2015a; Hilber and 
Lyytikäinen 2015)—are replaced with a proper annual local property 
tax with automatic annual revaluation based on neighborhood-speciﬁc 
price changes. Such a tax reform could be designed to be revenue neutral 
in the aggregate. 
An alternative and less radical proposal would be to provide 
incentives to local authorities through the central government’s grant 
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allocation system. This could be done by tweaking the grant allocation 
formula and taking account of the amount of housing development 
granted. Local authorities that facilitate residential development could 
be compensated with permanent and generous “development grants” 
that exceed the cost they have to bear. Alternatively, local authorities 
could be allowed to tax developers so they are compensated for any extra 
infrastructure or any other expenses that are required to accommodate 
additional development. Last, planning laws could be altered to allow 
developers (potential winners) to compensate NIMBYs (potential 
losers) in an attempt to reach a mutually beneﬁcial (i.e., Pareto-superior) 
outcome. 
6.3Housing Policies in Switzerland
Switzerland has one of the most decentralized governments in the 
world. The jurisdictional decentralization is reﬂected in the political 
autonomy of regional (cantons) and local (municipalities) administrative 
units. This autonomy provides two main instruments to municipalities 
to attract new taxpayers, both of which have a signiﬁcant impact on the 
housing market. The ﬁrst instrument is the ﬁscal package offered by the 
local municipality. The ﬁscal package consists of the local income tax 
rate (a lower tax rate will attract more and higher income taxpayers, all 
else equal) and the nature and level of local public services provided. 
Households will sort into the respective municipalities that provide 
their preferred local public goods package; better local public services, 
all else equal, are more desirable. This autonomy is the central idea of 
“ﬁscal competition”: cantons and municipalities compete against each 
other to attract (wealthy) taxpayers.
In principle, municipalities could compete on both the tax rate and 
the local public services offered. In practice, however, competition is 
mainly one of tax rates. This is because both the federal government 
and the cantons require high minimum standards of local public good 
provision. For example, primary and secondary school class sizes must 
not exceed 23–25 students in any of the cantons. Thus, local public 
services offered in Switzerland end up being relatively homogenous 
across municipalities within a canton. As a consequence, there is 
relatively little evidence of capitalization of local public services, all else 
equal. However, there is strong evidence that local income tax rates are, 
at least partially, capitalized into house prices. 
In an early paper, Hilber (1998) found that an annual tax increase of 
CHF 1,000 for an average taxpayer reduces rents in the Canton of Zurich 
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by roughly CHF 720. The present value of a tax increase of CHF 1,000 
reduces house values by roughly CHF 940 and land values between 
CHF 560 and CHF 1,620, depending on the speciﬁcation estimated. This 
suggests, roughly, full capitalization. 
In a more recent and econometrically rigorous analysis, Basten, von 
Ehrlich, and Lassmann (2014) look at all of Switzerland and employ a 
boundary-discontinuity design approach that corrects for unobservable 
location characteristics. They estimate the income tax elasticity of rents 
to be about 0.26 (compared with 0.54 based on a conventional estimating 
approach). That is, a tax increase of 10% reduces rents by about 2.6%. 
Basten, von Ehrlich, and Lassmann (2014) estimate that about two-
thirds of the tax elasticity is due to direct capitalization effects. About 
one-third can be traced back to the sorting of high-income households 
into low-tax municipalities. This latter study suggests that the extent 
of house-price capitalization may be only very partial in Switzerland, 
consistent with a more elastic housing supply curve compared with the 
UK.
The second, less well documented, instrument is land-use controls. 
Municipalities may implement lax or tight land-use controls to attract 
households with particular housing needs. One instrument is the so-
called “Ausnützungsziffer”, a utilization intensity factor that determines 
what fraction of land on a given plot may be physically developed. It is a 
type of exclusionary zoning, similar in nature to the “minimum lot size 
restriction” in the US. By setting a low Ausnützungsziffer, municipalities 
may attract better-off taxpayers who can afford a less-intensive use of 
land.
Municipalities also have to comply with mandatory land-use 
regulations emanated at the federal level, such as the sectorial plan 
for cropland protection. The plan aims to guarantee a sufficient supply 
of food for the country during times of crisis and war, protect the 
soil, and preserve good agricultural land in the long term. Due to the 
heterogeneous geographic features of the Swiss territory, about 77% 
of the land protected by the plan is concentrated in only seven cantons 
possessing large agricultural areas, thus, making the plan more binding 
for some municipalities than others. With the possible exception of 
Geneva, however, the impact of the plan on local housing prices seems to 
be weak for most of the cantons. In the case of Geneva, protected cropland 
effectively amounts to a green belt similar to the ones surrounding UK 
cities. The surrounding mountains, Lake Geneva, the Swiss boundary 
with France, and other fairly tight local land-use controls (including 
height restrictions)—which all make property supply inelastic—jointly 
explain the fact that Geneva has the most volatile property prices in 
Switzerland—in fact, resembling the price volatility in the UK.
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The fact that a local municipality’s tax revenue is directly determined 
by the number and nature of taxpayers provides strong incentives to (i) 
permit local development, and (ii) set local tax rates to attract high-
income households. This, in contrast to the setting in the UK, suggests 
that local housing supply curves may be elastic. 
Besides affecting local housing markets by encouraging tax 
competition among local authorities, the Swiss tax system also potentially 
affects the country’s homeownership rate. In fact, the Swiss tax system 
is fairly neutral with respect to homeownership at all levels. It is possible 
to deduct mortgage interest from taxable income in a similar fashion as 
under the US tax system. Importantly, the deductibility applies to both 
homeowners and landlords, so there is no differential tax treatment 
between the two. In a similar fashion, homeowners have to pay taxes 
on “imputed rents,” whereas landlords have to pay taxes on their rental 
income. Tax treatment is again neutral between the two groups. Thus, in 
contrast to most other countries, Switzerland’s tax and housing policies 
have little (or no) bias in favor of homeownership. 
In contrast to banking policies adopted in other European countries, 
Swiss banks do not require households to fully pay back their mortgage 
loans over a given period. Coupled with mortgage interest deduction, 
this creates a strong tax incentive for households—even wealthy ones—
to never fully repay their mortgage debts. This explains why Switzerland 
has one of the highest outstanding mortgage debt-to-GDP ratios in the 
world—exceeding 140% in 2012—despite the low homeownership rate 
of the country and despite the fact that initial loan-to-value ratios are 
low in an international comparison. 
In addition to the consequences arising from a decentralized 
government, Switzerland has to cope with another speciﬁc factor strongly 
inﬂuencing its housing market, i.e., the particular geographic features of 
its territory. In contrast to the UK, which has a fairly homogeneous ﬂat 
landscape, Switzerland’s geographic features affect both local housing 
supply and demand. On the one hand, lakes, mountains, and country 
borders strongly impede the development of major urban areas like 
Geneva and Zurich, thus reducing the elasticity of the housing supply 
in these places. On the other hand, the country’s geographic attributes 
increase the demand for investment homes (called “second homes” in 
Switzerland) by attracting wealthy foreigners in prestigious locations 
where ski resorts are located. 
Foreign second-home investments are affected by the Swiss franc 
exchange rate. Many foreign investors consider the Swiss housing market 
as a “safe bet,” providing signiﬁcant returns once real estate capital gains 
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are converted into home currencies.13 The pressure of foreign buyers on 
the Swiss housing markets is not only due to second-home investors, 
but also due to a signiﬁcant immigration inﬂow of persons who—for 
tax and quality of life purposes—transfer their primary residence to 
Switzerland. According to the Federal Statistical Office, in 2013, 23.8% of 
Swiss residents were foreigners, one of the highest rates of all European 
Union countries. 
6.3.1Current Status of the Housing Market
Switzerland regularly appears in world rankings as one of the countries 
with the highest per capita incomes,14 one of the most competitive 
economies,15 and the highest quality of life (Kekic 2012). Given the state of 
the country’s economy and the high standard of living, one might expect 
that most households own their home. The reality, however, is different. 
Switzerland displays one of the lowest homeownership rates—if not the 
lowest—among all developed countries (Figure 6.3) (missing years have 
been computed by linear interpolation). In 2013, it was 37.5%, increasing 
by 2.9% from 2000. The increase in the homeownership rate is arguably 
due to the negative trend in mortgage interests. In particular, from mid-
2008, ﬁxed mortgage interest rates have shown a strong negative trend 
and are presently below 2%.16 Bourassa and Hoesli (2010) suggested that 
high house prices and imputed rent taxation may represent two factors 
partially explaining Switzerland’s exceptionally low homeownership 
rate. As pointed out by Shiller (2013), the taxation of imputed rents 
distinguishes Switzerland from most other developed countries: in the 
US imputed rent taxation was abolished by the Supreme Court in 1934. 
The UK tried to adopt it, but the proposal was relinquished in 1963.
13 In contrast to what is observed in Japan, where the yen devaluation has arguably 
led to an increase of foreign investment into the residential sector, the Swiss franc 
appreciation of the last few years—and the corresponding price increase faced by 
foreign real-estate investors—did not negatively affect their investments. In fact, 
the Swiss franc traditionally represents a safe-store currency preserving capital 
gains from exchange rate ﬂuctuations, thus being particularly attractive to foreign 
investors in times of economic and political instability. This is particularly true for 
foreign investors with large ﬁnancial assets in Swiss banks. 
14 See The World Bank. Data. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
15 See World Economic Forum. Competitiveness Rankings. http://reports.weforum.
org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/rankings/
16 See https://en.comparis.ch/hypotheken/zinssatz/zinsentwicklung.aspx
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Figure 6.3 also depicts the incredibly low vacancy rates of the Swiss 
housing market, which ranged from 0.43% in 1989 to 1.85% in 1998. In the 
last 10 years, vacancy rates appear to have stabilized around 1%. This low 
number may be, in part, driven by the Swiss rent-control system, explained 
below. We note that vacancy rates are particularly low in major urban areas. 
For example, the vacancy rates in Geneva and Basel City are only 0.36% 
and 0.24%, respectively. These exceptionally low rates may be explained 
by two factors. First, rent control is particularly important in urban areas 
because they have extremely low homeownership rates, typically in the 
range of 10%. Second, a spatial shift of housing demand toward the major 
Swiss agglomerations can explain why few housing units remain empty in 
these places. According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, in 2012, major 
agglomeration centers accounted for 59% of the total population, covered 
only 12% of the country’s surface, and provided 70% of the employment.17 
17 See Statistik Schweiz. http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/regionen/11/
geo/raeumliche_typologien/00.html
Figure 6.3: Swiss Homeownership and Vacancy Rates (%) 
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In contrast to the UK, where construction numbers have been 
falling dramatically since the late 1970s, in Switzerland construction 
numbers since 1980 are cyclical but the long-run trend is roughly stable. 
Figure 6.4 shows construction indexes for all and for single-family 
construction. One interesting trend since about 2005 has been that more 
ﬂats and fewer single-family houses were constructed. Between 2002 
and 2011, the construction of new ﬂats has increased markedly. The 
yearly construction of new ﬂats during this time period increased from 
28,644 units to 47,174. In 2012 and 2013, however, the number of newly 
constructed dwellings has remained stable at around 45,000–46,000 
units. In 2014, according to Credit Suisse and the Swiss Association 
of Contractors and Builders, a general reduction of the residential 
construction sector could be observed and is expected to continue 
through 2015. As Waltert and Müggler (2014) point out, this may, in 
part, be due to both the implementation of the Second Home Initiative 
(discussed below), and the decision of the Swiss National Bank not to 
support the minimum exchange rate against the euro anymore (causing 
a signiﬁcant appreciation of the Swiss franc).
Figure 6.4: Swiss Construction Indexes: Total and Single-Family 
Houses (1983 = 100)
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Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office. http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/09.
html (accessed 12 December 2015). Authors’ calculations.
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Price dynamics also show major differences compared with the UK 
housing market (Figure 6.5). Three stylized facts are worth highlighting. 
First, real house prices in Switzerland are cyclical; three boom periods 
can be observed since 1970 (early 1970s, mid-to-late 1980s, and the period 
since 2000). Second, in contrast to the UK, where real house prices more 
than doubled since the early 1980s, in Switzerland real house prices 
merely increased by 23% (single-family prices) and 50% (condominiums) 
respectively. The difference in the growth rate between these two 
categories reﬂects the fact that the housing demand has shifted toward 
major urban areas, as suggested by the vacancy rate differentials observed 
between rural and urban areas. This hypothesis is further supported by 
the drop in vacancy rates observed from 2000 onward, which coincides 
with a strong growth in condominium prices. Third, rent growth is 
about halfway between the price growth of single-family houses and 
condominiums, and amounts to 33% since 1983. These increases are not 
too distant from the salary index growth (about 20% since 1983). 
Figure 6.5: Swiss Single-Family and Condominium Price 
Indexes (both real), Swiss Rental Index (CPI Subindex) (real), 
and Salary Index (real) (1983 = 100)
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December 2015); Authors’ calculations.
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The Swiss government has recently implemented several measures 
aimed at dampening the price growth of the owner-occupied housing 
sector (which may have been driven by the all-time low mortgage 
interest rates). Under government pressure, banks tightened lending 
conditions from July 2012 onward. In particular, the own funds required 
to have access to mortgage lending—typically 20% of the property 
price—cannot be exclusively constituted by the retirement provisions 
cumulated in the occupational pension funds. The part of own funds 
represented by retirement provisions is limited to 10% of the property 
price. Additionally, the loan-to-value ratio must at most be equal to 2/3 
after 20 years. To reduce the risk exposure borne by mortgage lenders, 
in June 2014 the Swiss government forced banks to increase the part of 
capital held against mortgage loans by an additional 2%. 
6.3.2Key Housing Policies and Their Objectives
In this section, we review two policies that currently have a strong 
impact on the Swiss housing market: rent control and the Second Home 
Initiative. The discussion on rent control builds on Werczberger (1997).
6.3.2.1Rent Control
The history of rent control in Switzerland is quite tormented. The control 
of rents was ﬁrst introduced during World War I. It was subsequently 
abolished in 1924. Due to the Great Depression, rent control was 
reintroduced in 1936. Once World War II ended, the control’s extent was 
progressively reduced, and, subsequently, abolished in 1970. This led to 
a signiﬁcant increase in rents, inducing the government to reintroduce 
rent control in 1972. Since then, several law modiﬁcations of rent control 
have been proposed, but a general consensus has not been reached and 
rent control is currently subject to controversy in political debates. 
Rohrbach (2014) provides a detailed exposition of the history of rent 
control in Switzerland.
The current level of renters’ protection is high in Switzerland. 
According to the existing federal law, landlords have to justify the 
magnitude of rent increases to their tenants.18 Rent levels can be adjusted 
according to two main economic indicators. The ﬁrst indicator is the so-
called rent reference index, which is based on the average of mortgage 
18 The biggest private landlords in Switzerland are insurance companies and banks, 
while the army and the national railway company are the two major institutional 
landlords. However, ﬁgures on the market shares of these landlords are not publicly 
available.
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interest rates provided by banks for the whole of Switzerland. The index 
cannot only be used by landlords to justify rent increases, but it can also 
be used by tenants to ask for rent reductions. The second indicator is 
the Swiss consumer price index (CPI). Up to 40% of the inﬂation, as 
measured by the Swiss CPI, can be passed on as higher rents. Although 
these measures might seem restrictive, the adjustment of rent levels to 
economic indexes was established to prevent abusive rent increases, 
while at the same time, providing landlords with reasonable returns 
on their investments. In addition to these two economic indicators, 
landlords can generally modify rents under two circumstances. First, 
the landlord performs a major renovation of the property and/or bears 
increased maintenance costs, which would lead to a reduction of the 
return on the investment. Second, rents are usually adjusted when a new 
tenancy starts, provided that the new rent is in line with the prevailing 
rent level observed in the same area. Importantly, new tenants are 
allowed to challenge a rent even after having taken possession of the 
property. This rule effectively prevents landlords from arbitrarily 
increasing rents between tenancies. 
Rent control also protects tenants against abusive evictions. 
Landlords are not allowed to rescind the tenancy contract simply to 
obtain more advantageous contract terms or to induce tenants to buy 
the property. Moreover, a change in the family status of a tenant, which 
does not inﬂict damage on the landlord, is not a sufficient reason for 
an eviction.
6.3.2.2 Ban on Second (Investment) Homes: The Second 
Home Initiative
Fiscal competition in conjunction with signiﬁcant immigration inﬂows 
strongly shapes urban development in Switzerland. In particular, as 
documented by Jaeger and Schwick (2014) urban sprawl has strongly 
increased during the last few decades. The apparent eagerness of Swiss 
citizens to protect their country’s landscape with its natural beauty and 
the widespread perception that second-home investors, in particular 
foreign real estate investors, were “disﬁguring” the countryside, 
creating ghost towns (outside of tourist seasons) in mountainous areas, 
and inﬂating local housing costs, has led to a political backlash. 
The Second Home Initiative (SHI) was launched to address these 
concerns.19 The initiative was approved by the Swiss population in 
19 See: http://www.zweitwohnungsinitiative.ch/home.html for details (in German, 
French or Italian). A brief summary in English is provided here: http://www.ffw.ch/
en/camp_detalle/second-homes-initiative-switzerland/2/11
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March 2012 by the narrowest of margins. Only 50.6% of the voters 
and 13.5 of the 26 cantons voted in favor of the initiative (for historical 
reasons, six cantons count as “half cantons”).20 The resulting ordinance, 
which came into force on 1 January 2013, prohibits the creation of new 
second homes in municipalities in which the second-home share of 
the housing stock exceeds 20%. Importantly, in these municipalities, 
the initiative also forbids the conversion of primary residences built 
after January 2013 into second homes. Primary homes built prior to 
that can, in principle, still be converted into second homes. This is a 
concession by the lawmakers during the legislation process with the aim 
to protect the property rights of existing homeowners in the affected 
municipalities. However, to avoid speculative behavior worsening 
the sprawl phenomenon, primary homes built before January 2013 
can be converted into second homes only if this does not lead to the 
construction of a new primary home in the same or nearby municipality 
facing the restriction. So, existing homeowners, who wish to convert 
their primary homes into second homes, effectively have to leave their 
home region. The regulation is far from being marginal, ﬁgures from the 
Federal Office for Spatial Development suggest that approximately one 
municipality out of ﬁve faces the restriction. 
The deﬁnition of “second home” depends on the amount of time the 
owner of the property spends in it. A “primary home” is a property in 
which the owner spends most of the time. All other properties a person 
may possess are considered to be second homes. Although the concept 
may sound vague, it is based on precise and long-established tax rules 
that have implications going far beyond the initiative’s regulations. 
In particular, the tax burden faced by households depends on where 
their primary home is located. The number of second homes in a 
given municipality is then simply approximated as the total number of 
dwellings minus the number of primary homes. 
6.3.3Merits and Demerits of Policies
In this section, we illustrate the merits and unintended effects of rent 
control and of the SHI. 
There is a vast and well-established literature on the negative 
consequences of implementing rent control. Rent control has been 
shown, among other things, to cause rent increases of not regulated units 
(Caudill 1993), perturb optimal allocation mechanisms (Glaeser and 
Luttmer 2003), lower housing quality (Gyourko and Linneman 1990), 
20 Interestingly, from a political-economical point of view, the most touristic cantons 
(and municipalities) that were most strongly affected all rejected the initiative.
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and reduce household mobility (Ault, Jackson, and Saba 1994). Our aim 
is not to extensively review this literature but, rather, to compare the 
speciﬁc effects of rent control observed in the Swiss housing market 
with those predicted by the literature.
The effects of the SHI—a recent policy reform—are currently 
being investigated by us and, to our knowledge, no empirical study on 
its effects exists. Therefore, only preliminary evidence concerning its 
effects is presented here. 
Rent control in Switzerland has several merits. First, as illustrated 
in Figure 6.5, real rents tend to grow slowly. Since 1983, real rents have 
grown only 13% more than salaries. The dampening effect of rent control 
becomes apparent when the price growth of condominiums—typically 
good substitutes for rented units—is considered. In the last few years, 
asking prices for condominiums have increased at a considerably higher 
rate than rents: since 1983, the growth differential between the two is 
17%. Second, in contrast to the cyclicality displayed by single-family 
homes and condominiums, rent volatility is quite low. Third, because all 
rental units are subject to rent control, there exists only one regulated 
rental housing market rather than two—a regulated and an unregulated 
one—with potentially vastly differing prices. Fourth, because the law 
ensures minimum quality standards, landlords cannot reduce building 
maintenance in the hope of increasing returns. On the contrary, major 
renovations present an opportunity to bring the rent of a controlled 
unit closer to market level. Finally, because new tenants have the right 
to challenge the rent level after renovation, speculative rent hikes can 
largely be prevented.   
These advantages, however, come at a price. Rent control induces 
a distortion in the allocation mechanism of the market by creating a 
disincentive for households to move. In fact, the most effective strategy 
for tenants to beneﬁt from rent control is to stay in the same unit as 
long as possible. This is a strategy that is facilitated by the lawmakers 
because rent control protects tenants against irregular evictions. As a 
consequence, rent increases are, to some extent, capped by the reference 
index and the CPI. In this setting, demand for rent-controlled properties 
signiﬁcantly exceeds supply, resulting in an extremely low residential 
vacancy rate—especially in major urban areas—as illustrated in Figure 
6.3, and, as a consequence, in a time-consuming and costly search effort 
for households forced to relocate.
Because the SHI was only recently approved, we can merely 
speculate about its long-term effects. To begin with, to the extent that 
local municipalities will not be able to uncover signiﬁcant loopholes in 
the legislation, we expect that the policy will be effective in preventing 
sprawl in the highly touristic places with shares of second homes 
already exceeding 20%. However, because demand for second homes 
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may simply shift spatially in the long term, sprawl may become an 
increasing problem in municipalities with shares of second homes below 
but close to 20%. Moreover, the ghost-town phenomenon (outside of 
tourist seasons) in mountainous municipalities with desirable natural 
amenities can be expected to become worse. This is because the only 
way to now add new second homes to the existing stock of such homes is 
by converting existing primary homes. Because the ban on new second 
homes has increased the scarcity of such homes in the most desirable 
tourist places, conversions from primary to second homes may further 
increase the second home share. 
The SHI legislation will likely also affect the prices of primary and 
second homes. The restriction to create new second homes in places 
that exceed the 20% threshold can be expected to be immediately 
capitalized into higher second-home prices—a supply-side effect. 
Because new second homes in restricted municipalities can only be 
created by converting primary homes constructed before 2013, the 
second-home supply can be expected to become progressively inelastic, 
thus capitalizing future demand increases. 
The SHI has two opposing effects on the price of primary homes. 
The price may decrease as the SHI imposes a negative shock on the 
local economy thus lowering demand for primary homes. However, by 
preserving local natural amenities the SHI may increase the price of 
primary homes, all else equal. The net effect is theoretically ambiguous.
Empirically, using a difference-in-difference approach, Hilber 
and Schöni (2016) ﬁnd that the price of primary homes in restricted 
municipalities decreased signiﬁcantly, on average, by about 12%, after the 
implementation of the SHI. They ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant effect of 
the SHI on the price of second homes, possibly due to the small number 
of transacted second homes in our sample. Banning new residential 
investment thus appears to hurt existing primary homeowners in 
affected areas but not existing owners of investment properties.
6.3.4Lessons Learned
The mild implementation of rent control in Switzerland has provided 
undeniable beneﬁts to renters, such as moderate price increases and 
protection against abusive evictions. These beneﬁts, however, also make 
households immobile. As a consequence, the increasing demand for 
dwellings situated in or near major urban areas—arguably fueled by strong 
immigration inﬂows—must mainly be satisﬁed by new construction. 
Because the Swiss ﬁscal decentralized system provides incentives to 
municipalities to attract new residents, local housing supply is elastic, 
leading to only moderate price and/or rent increases when hit by 
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signiﬁcant demand shocks. The situation is different when the geographic 
features of the territory decrease the elasticity of local housing supply. 
Geneva, for example, which has an urban area constrained by natural 
amenities, a national border with France, and strict land-use controls, has 
very high rents and housing prices compared with other Swiss cities. 
All in all, the decentralized system of Switzerland—with its strong 
local ﬁscal incentives—appears to be able to solve the housing affordability 
problem, unlike the centralized system of the UK. However, this solution 
comes at a cost: the ease with which local administrative units can build new 
homes has led to urban and (even rural) sprawl. With the approval of the 
SHI, Swiss citizens have given a clear message that they want to preserve the 
natural environment of the country by limiting the footprint of second-home 
investors. However, separating the primary- and second-home market has 
hurt local owners of primary residences in restricted areas.
6.4Housing Policies in the United States
The analysis of US housing policies perhaps represents one of the richest 
bodies of the policy evaluation literature (see Olsen and Zabel [2015] for 
an overview). This richness can be attributed to the variety and the extent 
of the implemented policies at the federal, state, and local level, and to the 
increasing quality of data available to researchers. It is not feasible to do 
justice to the richness of this literature in a single subsection of this paper. 
We, therefore, limit our analysis to those policies that were intended to 
preserve a pillar of the American dream: homeownership. 
Owning a house represents the achievement of the American 
dream for most US citizens. With the 2007–2009 global ﬁnancial crisis, 
however, this dream has turned into a nightmare for many homeowners. 
After a peak at the beginning of 2007, house prices fell by about 30% in 
less than 2 years. Millions of homeowners found themselves possessing 
negative home equities, thus, being unable to sell their home or not 
having access to reﬁnancing mortgages in the case of ﬁnancial need. The 
bust of the housing boom, coupled with soaring unemployment rates, 
led many US households to lose their homes, causing a steep decrease 
of about 5% in the country’s homeownership rate. To counter this drop 
in homeownership attainment, the US government adopted several new 
housing policies, in addition to the preexisting policies—importantly the 
mortgage interest deduction (MID). Our aim is to describe the intended 
and unintended effects of these new and old policies, with a particular 
focus on the MID.
The discussion of the policies presented in this subsection draws 
heavily from the work of Olsen and Zabel (2015), who offer an exhaustive 
review of US low-income rental programs and mortgage policies. In 
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contrast to Olsen and Zabel (2015), our focus is on the description of 
implications of the MID based on recent evidence provided by Hilber 
and Turner (2014). 
6.4.1Current Status of the Housing Market
The US housing market has recovered from perhaps the worst 
housing crisis in its history. So it seems, at least, when looking at the 
trends of housing market fundamentals (Figures 6.6 and 6.7). In this 
positive economic context, from December 2014 and March 2015 
onward, respectively, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac allowed ﬁrst-time 
homebuyers to lower their down payments to 3% instead of the usual 
5%. Moreover, the Federal Housing Administration recently reduced its 
annual mortgage insurance premium by 0.5% to 0.85%. Finally, some of 
the postcrisis housing programs aiming to boost homeownership are 
still under way (see next section). 
Figure 6.6: United States Homeownership and Vacancy Rates
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Given the current state of the US housing market, one might 
expect that the homeownership rate has stopped decreasing or, at least, 
has stabilized. Yet, this is not the case. Figure 6.6 documents the US 
homeownership rate between 1965 and 2014. Homeownership started 
to decline between 2004 and 2005, preceding the global ﬁnancial crisis 
(2007–2009) and its corresponding high number of foreclosures. It 
continued to decline after the end of the crisis. It is currently still on 
a downward trend, similar to the UK. From the fourth quarter (Q4) 
of 2004 to Q4 2014 the homeownership rate had fallen from 69.2% 
to 64%. Figure 6.6 also reports vacancy rates of owner-occupied and 
rental housing. Consistent with the homeownership statistics that 
imply an increase in demand for rental housing, vacancy rates for the 
latter type of housing fell signiﬁcantly from 10.6% in 2009 to 7.5% in 
2014. Interestingly, vacancy rates of owned units increased only slightly 
during the peak of the crisis. They generally remained fairly low and 
stable throughout the crisis. 
Figure 6.7: US House Price Index (real), Construction Index 
(New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits) 
and Mean Household Income (real) (1975 = 100)
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The observed decrease in the rate of homeownership may be 
explained by three factors. First, the massive increase in the price-to-
income ratio in the buildup of the global ﬁnancial crisis implied that, all 
else equal, fewer and fewer households were able to afford the monthly 
mortgage payments (i.e., liquidity constraints tightened). Second, the 
tightening of credit conditions (including down payment constraints) 
during the crisis meant that many households that were at the margin 
of property ownership before the crisis suddenly did not have access to 
mortgage lending anymore. Third, and related to the former point, bad 
credit ratings of households that experienced foreclosure during the 
crisis mean that they could not easily become homeowners again. 
Figure 6.7 illustrates the seasonally adjusted Purchase-Only House 
Price Index (HPI) since 1975 as well as the mean household income for 
the same time period. Focusing on the last 10 years, while the price-to-
income ratio fell signiﬁcantly during the global ﬁnancial crisis, the trend 
has been reversing since about 2011, all else equal, making it increasingly 
difficult for households to have access to property ownership. At the 
same time, increasing prices during the last few years appear to have 
revived the construction sector. Figure 6.7 documents the number of 
housing starts between 1960 and 2014. Housing construction appears to 
be highly cyclical in the US. While it fell dramatically during the 2000s, 
housing construction has been recovering since around 2011.
Local housing markets in the US show remarkable spatial 
heterogeneity with respect to their price dynamics. Figures 6.8 and 6.9 
illustrate the price growth since 1980 for three major inland cities—
Akron (Ohio), Columbus (Ohio), and Indianapolis (Indiana)—and 
three major coastal ones—San Francisco (California), Los Angeles 
(California), and New York (New York)—respectively. Inland housing 
markets have rarely been affected by the crisis and display a very low—
if not negative—real price growth since 1980. In contrast, the coastal 
cities (sometimes referred to as “superstar cities”; (Gyourko, Mayer, and 
Sinai 2013) that possess severe natural as well as regulatory constraints 
(Saiz 2010; Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2013), show astonishing long-
term price increases—with San Francisco reaching a real price growth 
of about 300% since 1980—and large price volatility. The price trends 
depicted in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 are consistent with the proposition that 
given demand shocks (which may or may not be greater in large coastal 
cities) translate into greater price swings in places with severe long-
term supply constraints, i.e., the superstar cities.21
21 These ﬁndings are consistent with the ﬁndings of Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) 
for England. They are also consistent with the theory put forward in Hilber and 
Robert-Nicoud (2013) that more desirable places (in the US: coastal cities) are more 
physically developed and, as a consequence of owners of developed land becoming 
more politically inﬂuential, more regulated. 
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Figure 6.8: US Inland Metro Areas House Price Index (real) 
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6.4.2Key Housing Policies and Their Objectives
The current US tax system is biased in favor of homeownership. 
Importantly, whereas mortgage interest can be deducted from taxable 
income, imputed rents associated with property ownership are not 
taxed.22 
22 It is worth noting that the mortgage interest deductibility is a popular policy, 
implemented in numerous developed countries to promote homeownership. The 
UK used to have a form of mortgage interest deduction—the Mortgage Interest 
Relief at Source (MIRAS). The MIRAS was introduced in 1969 but phased out from 
1988 until it was completely abolished in 2000. Due to the numerous demerits and 
unintended consequences of the MID, which are discussed below, the slow phasing 
out and subsequent termination of the MIRAS can be seen as a highly successful 
policy decision.
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The broad deductibility of interest on all loans in the US dates back 
to 1894 when the ﬁrst modern federal income tax was created. It was the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 that conﬁned deductibility to mortgage interest 
only. The aim of the reform has been to encourage homeownership. 
The MID is a costly policy, representing about $100 billion in foregone 
annual tax revenue for the US government. Despite the already-existing 
bias toward homeownership, the bust of the housing boom during the 
global ﬁnancial crisis has led the US government to adopt yet more 
ﬁscal measures in an attempt to halt the decline in homeownership 
attainment. 
In 2008, the Congress passed the Housing Assistance Tax Act 
(HATA), which provides a tax credit of 10% of the purchase price of a 
property for ﬁrst-time homebuyers. The maximal tax credit was capped 
to $7,500 per household and the requirement was that it had to be repaid 
Figure 6.9: US Coastal Metro Areas House Price Index (real) 
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within 15 years. To limit the vacancy of foreclosed properties, while 
avoiding speculative behavior, in 2009, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) increased the maximal tax credit to $8,000 
and offered the possibility to waive the credit repayment if the property 
was not sold during the 3 years after its acquisition and was used as 
the principal residence. At the end of 2009, President Obama signed 
the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act into law, 
extending the period during which households could claim the ARRA 
tax credit. According to the General Accounting Office, up to July 2010 
approximately 1 million and 16 million ﬁrst-time homebuyers beneﬁted 
from the HATA and ARRA tax credits, respectively.
In addition to ﬁscal incentives, the US government launched several 
programs to enhance credit conditions.23 In early 2009, the Treasury 
started the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program to improve credit 
conditions. Two centerpieces of the MHA are the Home Affordable 
Modiﬁcation Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable Reﬁnance 
Program. Both programs end in December 2016. The two programs are 
not intended to promote homeownership but, rather, to avoid the loss of 
it by reducing the likelihood of foreclosure. HAMP’s aim is to cooperate 
with mortgage lenders to reduce the monthly mortgage payments 
of homeowners at risk of foreclosure by decreasing interest rates, 
lengthen the loan’s term up to 40 years, and deﬁne a balloon payment 
at the maturity date. The Home Affordable Reﬁnance Program’s goal 
is to provide credit access to homeowners who possess negative home 
equities. More speciﬁcally, homeowners who had their mortgages owned 
or guaranteed by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae and who were current with 
their payments (in contrast to HAMP) were initially allowed to reﬁnance 
their debt even if the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of their properties was 
between 80% and 125%. In a subsequent modiﬁcation of the program 
in 2011, these LTV limits were suppressed for mortgages up to 30 years, 
thus allowing households with deeply underwater assets to reﬁnance. 
In February 2010, President Obama approved the Hardest-Hit-
Fund (HHF) program to help households living in states that were 
particularly affected by the global ﬁnancial crisis. States displaying 
unemployment rates greater or equal to the national average and having 
experienced average housing price decreases greater than 20% were 
accepted into the program. Many of these states (California, Oregon, 
Nevada, and Florida, among others) host some of the most expensive 
23 See the US Department of the Treasury website (http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/ﬁnancial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/Pages/default.aspx) for a 
more in-depth description of these programs. Due to a lack of participation, we do 
not consider the HOPE for Homeowner Act in the present subsection of the paper.
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cities in the world. In the same spirit of the MHA program, the HHF’s 
aim was to reduce the mortgage burden of households owning negative 
housing equity.
6.4.3Merits and Demerits of Policies
We ﬁrst discuss the impact of the MID in some depth, because it offers 
the most compelling empirical evidence. With the exception of the MID, 
the policies reviewed in the previous section are recent and many are 
still current. Therefore, only limited information is available concerning 
their effects on the US housing market. In this section, we offer an 
analysis based both on informal evidence and on recent empirical 
ﬁndings. 
Due to the staggering cost of the MID, two main questions are of 
interest. The ﬁrst is whether the policy produces the effect that justiﬁes 
its existence, i.e., to increase homeownership. The second is whether 
unintended consequences follow its implementation. The answers to 
these questions appear to be negative for the former and affirmative for 
the latter. 
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) provide evidence supporting the 
proposition that homeownership is not inﬂuenced by the MID. They 
point out that households on the margin between owning and renting 
usually do not use the deduction to reduce their taxable income. As a 
consequence, the MID does not create new homeowners but, rather, 
increases the housing consumption of well-off households. According to 
Gervais and Manish (2008), wealthy households may use equity ﬁnancing 
if the MID is not available, further providing support for the hypothesis 
that the homeownership decision of these households is not inﬂuenced 
by the deduction. Even worse, Bourassa and Ming (2008) provide some 
evidence that the MID lowers the homeownership rate among young 
households due to price capitalization effects. Hilber and Turner (2014) 
provide strong evidence on the unintended consequences of the MID. 
They show that the deduction only promotes homeownership of higher-
income households where the housing supply is elastic. This effect on 
the higher-income group is reversed in housing markets with strong 
regulatory constraints. Interestingly, they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship 
between homeownership and the MID for low-income households. The 
net effect of the MID on homeownership is roughly equal to zero.  
We now present some informal evidence concerning the HATA/
ARRA and HAMP housing programs.24 Baker (2012) provides a 
24 To the authors’ knowledge, no conclusive study is currently available on the effect of 
the Home Affordable Reﬁnance Program and HHF programs. 
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descriptive analysis of the effect of the tax credit. He points out how 
the program’s effects were only temporary. The program considerably 
boosted home sales when it began (June 2009), and a marked decline 
was observed when it ended (July 2010). In this respect, it seems that the 
program—rather than supporting the demand in the long term—simply 
shifted the homeownership decision in time, thus having no effect on 
the long-term homeownership rate. Interestingly, Baker provides some 
evidence that the program only inﬂuenced the purchase of bottom-tier 
properties in less-expensive markets. He justiﬁes his claim by arguing 
that new homebuyers generally buy inexpensive properties, and that the 
$8,000 tax credit is not likely to have an inﬂuence in expensive housing 
markets like New York or Boston. 
An early theoretical study by Mulligan (2010) discusses how the 
guidelines imposed by HAMP to take part in the program may have 
negative effects on mortgage renegotiations. In particular, he points out 
that renegotiations do not lead, in general, to a reduction of the principal 
mortgage and do not decrease households’ uncertainty. Due to these 
facts, he stresses how the program only avoids some foreclosures in the 
short term, but basically shifts in time the efforts required to prevent the 
others. 
Using a difference-in-difference identiﬁcation strategy, Agarwal et 
al. (2012) empirically demonstrate the inefficiency of the HAMP program. 
Using second-home investors who are not eligible for the program as 
the control group, they show that promoted mortgage renegotiations 
only had limited inﬂuence on the rate of foreclosures and virtually no 
effect on other economic variables such as declining house prices and 
employment. Additionally, they point out that the lack of responsiveness 
to the program (only 1.2 million mortgages were renegotiated compared 
with a target of 3–4 million) can be attributed to the rigid organizational 
capability of a few large loan lenders, who were not able to renegotiate 
mortgages. They conclude by stressing that short-term policies aiming 
to modify the behavior of large mortgage lenders are of limited effect. 
Finally, using a simulation approach, Hembre (2014) assesses the 
impact of HAMP on credit defaults by comparing it with a hypothetical 
counterfactual housing program in which households were not able to 
renegotiate their mortgage debt. He ﬁnds that the HAMP expects to 
prevent slightly over 500,000 defaults after 5 years. He shows, however, 
that the exorbitant program cost of $20.8 billion greatly exceeds the 
roughly estimated social costs associated with foreclosures, concluding 
that the program resulted in a net loss of $12.7 billion. 
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6.4.4Lessons Learned
Several lessons can be learned from the present analysis. Some of 
them directly result from the above analysis, while others are less 
straightforward. 
To begin with, housing policy makers seem to be obsessed with 
the desire to modify the demand side of the market (e.g., via mortgage 
subsidies such as the MID), arguably because it is the easiest way to reach 
a broad consensus among voters. Capozza, Green, and Hendershott 
(1996) or Hilber and Turner (2014), for example, show however that 
modiﬁcations of ﬁscal incentives in housing markets that have an 
inelastic supply are capitalized into higher housing prices. Additionally, 
research conducted by Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2010) and Mayer 
(2011) demonstrates the important role played by the supply elasticity to 
determine equilibrium prices. 
In particular, we point out that future policies should take the spatial 
heterogeneity of the housing market into account. The US provides a 
good example of the spatial dependence of supply constraints and of the 
consequences of neglecting them when making housing policies. Supply 
constraints are not only due to local regulatory restrictions, but also by 
the nature of the local geographic area in which the housing market is 
located (Saiz 2010). 
Our analysis suggests that simply pouring subsidies homogenously 
across the country through ad hoc programs aiming to shift the housing 
demand without considering the local supply elasticity of housing 
markets can be counterproductive. The HHF program is an example of 
such bad practice. The largest allocation share (almost $2 billion) went 
to California. Given the nature of supply conditions in the large coastal 
Californian metropolitan areas, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
only effect of the allocation on the housing markets of San Francisco 
and Los Angeles was to further increase housing prices and augment 
the market volatility. Consistent with this, illustrated in Figure 6.9, 
the two cities experienced a strong price increase after the HHF was 
implemented. 
Other lessons that can be learned are typically intrinsic to some 
ﬂaws present in the policy implementation itself. Financial incentives 
and mortgage policies should avoid to simply shifting purchase decisions 
and foreclosures in time. Otherwise, all these policies will achieve is a 
short-term disequilibrium of the housing market that will disappear as 
soon as the program ends. 
Finally, a trivial lesson is to take the legal and organizational 
frameworks into account. If the demand or supply side of the market 
cannot react to the proposed incentives, the policies will be largely 
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ineffective. An example of limited supply response is provided by the 
inability of large mortgage lenders to renegotiate mortgages. On the 
demand side, it appears that credit score constraints of delinquent 
borrowers prevent them from beneﬁting from the policies’ incentives.
6.5Synthesis
In this paper, we review the key housing policies implemented in 
three developed countries that differ markedly in their institutional 
settings, economic conditions, and geographic features. Our analysis 
suggests that differences in these factors manifest themselves in diverse 
supply conditions (i.e., supply price elasticities) and these, in turn, are 
associated with two distinct housing problems: housing affordability (in 
the case of inelastic supply) and sprawl (in the case of elastic supply). 
The housing policies implemented to address these problems typically 
focus on the demand side, perhaps because they are politically more 
appealing. These demand-side policies, in turn, often have unintended 
(distributional and allocative efficiency) consequences via house price 
capitalization effects that are typically ignored by policy makers. 
Our analysis of the UK and Swiss government systems—highly 
centralized versus decentralized—suggests that ﬁscal incentives may 
play a major role in determining the local housing supply elasticity 
and may thus explain issues of local housing affordability or of sprawl, 
respectively. The two opposite systems come with their own advantages 
and drawbacks. A highly centralized government providing few ﬁscal 
incentives at the local level for residential development, corresponding 
urban containment via green belts, height restrictions that prevent 
horizontal expansion, and other regulatory constraints prevent urban 
sprawl but generate an acute housing-affordability crisis. In contrast, a 
system of ﬁscal competition with strong incentives at the local level to 
permit residential development implies lower house-price inﬂation but 
comes at the cost of urban sprawl. 
The US differs enormously across space in its geographic constraints 
as well as its ﬁscal and regulatory features. While urban sprawl is a 
concern in large parts of the midwest and the south of the country, high 
house prices and corresponding lack of affordability are a major issue 
in coastal superstar cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New 
York. The US, which has implemented numerous housing policies in 
recent years and provides access to rich data, thus provides a unique 
laboratory for empirical research.
Policy makers in the US and the UK, faced with housing-
affordability problems and concerns about homeownership attainment, 
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tend to focus on demand-side solutions. Demand-side policies such as 
the MID or Help-to-Buy may be popular among voters but they tackle 
symptoms rather than root causes. The key problem with these demand-
side policies is that they have unintended and counterproductive 
consequences in severely supply-constrained places. This is because the 
demand-induced price increases offset the desired effects of the policy. 
More generally, the impact of housing policies ought to be evaluated 
in a general equilibrium framework rather than in a partial one. For 
example, a partial equilibrium analysis may focus on the direct incentive 
effects of demand-side subsidies such as the MID or Help-to-Buy and 
ignore the fact that such subsidies spur housing demand and thus 
increase house prices in supply inelastic places. Another example is the 
Swiss SHI. While the SHI may achieve one objective—to combat sprawl 
in the most touristic areas—it may create a few new problems (via 
general equilibrium effects): adverse effects on the local economy in the 
touristic areas, an increase of the ghost town phenomenon in these areas 
(outside of tourist seasons), long-term sprawl in semi-touristic areas 
( just below the initiative’s threshold of 20% second homes), and price 
declines for existing local primary homeowners in touristic areas. Given 
the particular features of the legislation, the latter effect is arguably 
more pronounced among the elderly and less-educated, lower-income 
homeowners since because they are typically less mobile, so the cost of 
converting their primary home into a second home and move away to 
another region may render their conversion option worthless. 
One central conclusion from our analysis is that policy makers ought 
to be cautious when implementing new housing policies; especially 
“blanket” demand-side policies in countries that contain areas with 
severe supply constraints. Instead, policy makers ought to focus on 
correcting market failures and take supply conditions into account 
when designing policies. 
While large green belts (with intensive agricultural use) surrounding 
cities, in combination with tight height controls and lack of ﬁscal 
incentives at the local level (as is the case in the UK), are a recipe for a 
housing-affordability crisis, creating and maintaining local public parks 
(a local public good), preserving areas of outstanding natural beauty 
(because of their positive externalities and option values), or protecting 
truly historical buildings or neighborhoods (again because of positive 
externalities) are all sensible local (planning) policies. They increase 
social welfare yet will not create a housing affordability problem as long 
as there are still enough incentives to permit and develop tall buildings 
in the center and larger single-family houses in the periphery. If the lack 
of sufficient new housing construction is the perceived problem, then 
local taxes that provide ﬁscal incentives to local policy makers to permit 
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development could be an effective means to create more affordable 
housing. 
In a similar vein, if sprawl is perceived by voters to generate negative 
externalities, then a new national tax on the consumption of developed 
residential land (i.e., a property [or, ideally, land-value] tax that has to 
be paid irrespective of whether a property or a parcel of land is used as 
the primary or secondary home) could discourage non-intensive use of 
residential land and could provide the right kind of incentives to prevent 
sprawl. At the same time, it would not provide additional incentives to 
local planning boards to permit development. Such a national tax might 
provide a much more efficient tool to combat sprawl with fewer side 
effects than banning second homes in touristic areas altogether. Such 
a reform could be designed revenue neutral. For example, in the case 
of Switzerland, the federal income tax (and corresponding deadweight 
losses) could be reduced by the amount of revenue the new tax generates. 
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